Child Endowments, and the Quantity and Quality of Children by Gary S. Becker & Nigel Tomes
NBER Working Paper Series
CHILDENDOWMENTS, AND THEQUANTITY





CENTER FOR ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR
AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
204 Junipero Serra Boulevard, Stanford, CA 94305
February 1976
Preliminary; not forquotation.
NBERworking papersare distributed informally and in limited
numberfor conuDents only. They should not be quoted without
written permission of the author.
This report has not undergone the review accorded official
NBERpublications; in particular, it has not yet been submitted
for approval by the Board of Directors.
This research was supported by a grant from the National Institute
of Child Health and Human Development, grant #5—ROl—HDO716103.
*Universityof Chicago and NBER.
of Chicago.1.Introduction
rn an earl ie.r paper, Becker and Lewis explained why the quantity and quality
of children (and, by extension, of riany other commodities) are more closely related
than are any two commodities chosen at random, without assuming that substitution
in consumption between quantity and quality is greater than average.It is
sufficient to recognize than an Increase In the quantity of children raises the
cost or shadow price of the quality of children, and vice versa. This was used
to explain, among other things, why the observed Income elasticity of demand for
quality of children is high at the same time that the observed quantity elasticity
is low and often even negative.
As part of a more recent paper on social interactions,1 Becker discussed some
other determinants of the demand for quality of children. These include the pre-
ferences of parents with regard to their own consumption relative to that of
their children, public expenditures on schooling, and genetic inheritance.
Becker shows that "social interactions" can also explain the high observed income
elasticity of demand for quality of children.
This paper brings together and integrates social interactions and the spe-
cial relation between quantity and quality. We are able to show that the
observed quality income elasticity would be relatively high and the quantity
e1astcity relatively lowandsometimes negative, even if the true "unobserved"
Income elasticities for quantity and quality were equal and of average value.
Moreover, the observed quality elasticity would fall, and the observed quantity
elasticity would rise, as parental income rose. These and related results
on the relation of, observed quantity and quality Income elasticities to social2
mobility and economic growth are discussed in Section 2.
Section 3dropsthe assumption made in Section 2 that allchildrenare
ofequalquality, and considers differences in endowment and quality.It ana-
lyzes how parental expenditures are related to theirchildren's endowment: in
particular, whether better endowments are reinforced or poorerendowments are
compensated.It explores the resulting biases in estimates of rates of return on
investments In human capital, and in estimates of the direct effectof family
background on earnings.It also shows why compensatory education programs may
appear to "fail," even when the children being"compensated" were as able and
well motivated as other children.
2.Interaction between the Quantity and Quality ofChildren2
We assume in this section that each household has a utility functionof
the following form
U -U(n,w, y), (2.1)
where n Is the number of children, w the quality of each child,and y the
aggregate amount of all other commodities. By saying"the" quality we have intro-
duced the assumption that the quality of each child Is the same.This quality
Is partly controlled by the household through its expenditures onchildren, and
Is partly outside its control because inheritedability,3 public investments in
children, "luck" and other variables also affect quality.The aggregate "endow—
ment" of each child Is assumed to be thesame,4 so that parental contributions
must be the same if total quality Is to be the same.
With some assumptions, the production function relating child quality to
household and endowed inputs can be written simply as the additive function,
w e +q ,5 (2.2)
where e k the endowed, and q Is the household, contribution tothe total quality w.3
The household's budget constraint is
pyy +Pqfll
=i , (2.3)
where I is its own income, p is the price of y, Pq is the average cost of
increasing q by one unit, and pnq is its total expenditure onchildren.6
If e were exogenous and independent of the level of q, a household could take
e as given in determining its optimal q. Then maximizing the utility function (2.1)
subject to the budget constraint (2.3) and the production functions (2.2)
yields, if Pq were fixed,
Mu—Ap Xir
y y y
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where A is the marginal utility of income, '
—
flPq
is the shadow price or
cost of increasing quality, and ir qp is the shadow price of increasing
quantity. By substituting these prices and the function (2.2) into the own
Income equation (2.3), the equation for commodity consumption is obtained:
ry+1rn+irw I+irw —S , (2.5)
y n w w
where S is the household's social income.
The important point is that the shadow price of the quality of children is
proportional to the quantity of children, and the shadow price of quantity is
proportional to the household's contribution toquality.7 Quantity and quality
interact in this way because an increase in the number of children increases
the cost of raising the quality of children since the higher quality applies to
more children; similarly, an increase in quality raises the cost of an additional
child since higher quality children are more expensive. Therefore, an "exogenous"
change In the quantity or quality of children would induce further changes
through this Interaction. For example, an increase in quality would raise the4
shadow price of quantity, which would reduce thedemand for quantity, but this
in turn would lower the shadow price of quality,which would induce an additional
increase in quality, and soon.8
To see the consequences of this interaction for behavior,define the "tru&
commodity income elasticities n1, I y,w, and n, as the percentage change in
commodity consumption per one percent changein social Income S, with commodity
shadow prices 71.,heldconstant. Also define the "observed" Income elasticities,
as the percentage change in consumption per one percent change in own income
i, with market prices p1, held constant.Becker-Lewis ignore social Interactions
by assuming that the endowment is zero, sothat by equation (2.2),
child quality would simply be Identical with parentalcontributions. They show
that the observed Income elasticities of quantityand quality would be equal if
their true elasticities were equal and if othercommodities were equally sub-
stitutable with quantity and quality.
They state, however, that "it is plausible to assumethat the true income
elasticity with respect to quality (nq) is substantiallylarger than that with
respect to quantity (na)." It thenfollows from the increase in the relative
shadow price of quantity induced by the relatively largeincrease in quality that
the observed quantity income elasticity wouldbe lower than its true elasticity;
Indeed, the observed elasticity could be lowand even negative at the same time
that the true elasticity was significantly positive.On the other hand, the
observed quality elasticity would be even larger than its trueelasticity if
the induced substitution of quality for quantitydominated other effects.
By dropping the Becker-Lewis assumptionof no endowment, all of their results5
can be derived without assuming that the true quality elasticity n exceed
the true quantity elasticity n. For if e >0were fixed, dw —dq,and
-. R> , (2.5)
qqw w w
w e where R —— —I+—
q q
then clearly
n Rn >n =n . (2.6)
q ww n
If the endowment's contribution were sizeable, R would be much above unity, and
the true own contribution quality elasticity (flq) would be substantially above
the true total quality elasticity (nv) .Since•the latter is assumed to equal
the true quantity elasticity (n), it has been shown why "the true (own contribu-
tion] income elasticity ••fl
Issubstantially larger than ...n"even when
n n.
w n
All the results of Becker—Lewis on the relation between observed and true
income elasticities would then follow even though the true quantity and total
quality elasticities were equal. In particular, the observed would be less
than the true quantity elasticity: the former could be small and even negative
at the same time that the latter was sizeable. The observed elasticity for
quantity ()wouldbe smaller and for quality ()larger,the more important
was the endowment's contribution to total quality.
As own income continued to rise with the endowment fixed, the ratio
R —w/qwould fall, as long as child quality had a positive observed income
elasticity, because the increase in w would result entirely from an increase in q.
By equation (2.6), the fall In R would reduce the true own—contribution quality
elasticity flq• A reduction in this elasticity would, via the induced interaction
between quantity and quality, then raise the observed quantity eFasticity ()
andlower even further the observed own-contribution quality elasticity6
That is, the observed quantity elasticity,small and perhaps negative at
lower income levels, would rise as income rose, while theobserved quality
elasticity, large at lower income levels, would fallasincome rose.9
Figure 1 plots the relation bewteen number of childrenand income that
Is typically observed. The curves generally decline at the lowestincome
levels, and often trun up at the highest levels. By usingthe distinction between
a household's and the endowment's contribution to quality,and the interaction
between quantity and quality, we have been able to explain allthe Important
features of this observed relation, including its nor,—monotonicity,while
assuming that the true quantity elasticity was constantand of average value.
The shape of the typical relation between household expenditures on quality
of children and income is not as well known. The same analysisthat explains
the non—monotonic relation in Figure 1 implies the concaverelations in
Figure 2. Household expenditures on quality,would grow rapidly at lower incomes,
and then at a decreasing rate even though the true total qualityelasticity was
constant and of average value. Consequently, the verydifferent patterns
for observed quantity and quality graphed in Figures 1 and2 are consistent with
true quantity and quality income elasticities that are constant,equal to each
other, and also equal to the average income elasticity.
The assumption that the endowment is the same at alllevels of own income
is not realistic. For example, if own income were higherbecause of greater
parental ability, some of that greater abilitywould be genetcaHy transmitted
to their chHdren, and the endowment's contribution would thereby increase.
Or, since higher income persons live in wealthiercommunities, public contri-

















Therefore, instead of assuming that the endowment's contribution to quality
Is constant, we assume that Its size increaseS byper cent for each one per
cent increase In own income. The coefficient l-5 Is a measure of the degree of
Intrinsic social mobility,11 or Intrinsic regression to the mean across genera-
tions. Typically, l-sS Is less than I and significantly greater than zero,
although values out of this range are possible.
An increase only in the endowment would increase social income, and,
therefore, would increase the demand for children, child quality, and all other
superior commodities. The own—contribution to child quality must fall, however,
because the increased expenditures on children and other commodities would be
"financed" by a reduction in own expenditures on child quality. The decline in
own-contributions must be less than the rise in the endowment if total child
q'iality increases;12 the difference Is determined by the income and price
elasticities of demand for quality.
Therefore, an increase in own income would have a more positive effect on
the quantity of children, the larger 6 is, or the more the endowment increased
as own income increased; similarly, the effect on own—contributions to quality
Would be smaller, the larger 6 is. Put differently, the observed quantity
own-income elasticity would be smaller, and the observed quality own—income
elasticity would be bigger, the greater the degree of intrinsic intergenera-
tional mobility.
Two curves are shown in Figures 1 and 2: one when 60, or when the
Intrinsic mobility is complete, and the other when 6 —.5,a 50 per cent
intrinsic regression toward the mean. Since the quantity elasticity is
positively related to 5, the curve representing 6 —.5in Figure 1 falls
less rapidly at lower income levels, hits a trough earlier, and rises more8
substantiallythan does the curve for 60. Similarly, since the quality
elasticity is inversely related to 5, the curve representing 6 =.5 in
Figure 2 is below the one for 60.
The Indianapolis survey in l911wasprobably the first major survey of
fertility behavior in the United States. One hypothesis investigated wasthat
"the families of socially mobile couples are smaller than those of socially
nonmobile couples of comparable status.13 The evidence tended to support this
hypothesis. Our analysis does imply that number of children andthe degree of
social mobility are negatively related; it also Implies, however, that (own—
contributions to) the quality of children and mobility are positively related.
The evidence from the Indianapolis survey supports the implication about quan-
tity, although our analysis dir3ctly links quantity to the anticipatedintrinsic
11,
mobilityof the children, not to the observed mobility of their parents.
Our analysis of the effects of social mobility also implies that a general
increase in income due say to economic growth has quite differenteffects
on the quantity and quality of children than does anincrease in one house-
hold's income relative to that of other households. For, presumably, persons
experiencing an increase in relative income expect greater regressionto the mean
In their children's endowment than:do persons experiencing an increasedue
to economic growth. Therefore, the quantity income elasticityestimated from
differences in relative income —thatis, from "cross—sectional" differences
In income -wouldbe smaller than thçelasticitydue to economic growth —that
is, from "time series" differences; similarly, the quality elasticityestimated
from differences in relative income would be larger.
An increase in the rate of growth of income over time has additional9
implicationsbecause it increases the endowments of children relative to the
incomes of their parents.15 Since an increase in child endowments would re-
duce the investment by parents in children, which in turn would reduce the
(shadow) cost of children, the (relative) redistribution of social income
to children produced by increased growth would increase the number of children.
Therefore, the number of children would be positively related, and parental
Investment per child negatively related, to the (autonomous) rate of growth
In income.
Our conclusions about the effects of economic growth on the number of
children are similar to those reached by Richard Easterlin in his important
work on fertility. Although both Easterl in's and our own analysis are
based on changes in the economic position of children relative to that of
their parents17 we do not make any special assumptions about preferences,
while Easterlin appears to rely heavily on such assumptions. Since they
are not necessary to reach his conclusions, his emphasis on the way pre-
ferences are formed is superfluous; moreover, we believe that it has
diverted attention from the important part of his analysis.
The distinction between "true" and "observed" income elasticities in
the Becker-Lewis paper has been criticized by persons who argue that only
the observed elasticities are needed to analyze behavior. We hope that
this serious misapprehension Is now put to rest. Observed elasticities
would tend to be quite unstable, even when the true ones are constant, be-
cause they depend on the level of income, the degree of social mobility, the
rate of growth of income over time, and other variables .Presumablythis
is why there is such a bewildering array of empirical estimates of the rela-
tion between income and fertility (see Simon). The distinction between
observed and true elasticities helps create order out of the seemingly ran-
dom variation in the observed relation between income and fertility.10
The relation between true and observed quantity and quality price elasti-
cities is also influenced by the size of the endowment. For example, an
increase inPq
the market price of quantity and quality, would reduce
quality by more than quantity because a fixed endowment implies that the
entire reduction In quality is achieved by a reduction in the household's con-
tribution, which reduces the shadow price of quantity relative toquality.18
3. Compensation and Reinforcement of Differences AmongChildren19
We have been assuming that the total quality and endowment of each child
is the same, so that parental contributions to each must also be the same. This
section explores some consequences of dropping the assumption of equal endowments,
and of introducing differences in ability, public support, "luck," and other
factors. We isolate the effect of differences in endowments from differences in
preferences toward children by assuming "child—neutral preferences;" that is,
the marginal utility to parents from changes in child quality is the same for
all children when their qualities are equal. Formally, the utility function
U U (y, w1,... ,w) (3.1)
has the following separability property
.IY./ >1if w. <w. w. w. I J
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where w. is the quality of the ith child.
Let the endowments of two children differ because one inherited greater
ability (or for any other reason).If the cost or price of adding to their
quality were pand p ,respectively,parental contributions to the quality of
q1 q2




If the cost of adding to quality were the same, even when children
differed in ability or other aspects of their endowment, then equations (3.2) and
(3.3)immediatelyimply that total qualities would also be the same: differences
in parental contributions would fully compensate for differences In endowments.
In other words, within a family, the amount invested by parents in a child would
be perfectly negatively correlated with the endowment of the child.21
The family would contribute to equality by redistributing to less endowed
children and to parents some of the increased family wealth resu'ting from
better endowments. This conclusion Is essentially a special case of a general
theorem in social intàractions (Becker, 1974); namely, that If a family "head"
is voluntarily transferring some of his own resources to different members, a
redistribution of endowed resources among members would induce the "head" to
"tax" the entire gain of those gaining and compensate fully those losing.
The conclusions are somewhat different If the cost of adding to quality
were related to endowments. For example, it Is often lower for abler children;
on the other hand, public programs that compensate for inferior backgrounds or
abilities raise the endowments of children with relatively high costs.22
If, on balance, the cost of adding to quality were negatively related to the
endowment, equations (3.2) and (3.3)implythat the desired quality of children
would be positively related to their endowment. Clearly, less well endowed
children no longer are fully compensated by their parents, indeed, parents could
actually reinforce differences in endowments. Two opposing forces are at work:
a 'woa1th" effect that induces parents to compensate less well endowed children,
and an efficiency or "price" effect that induces them to reinforce better endowed
chi ldren.
Although the net outcome of the wealth and price effects may seem to be
indeterminant here, as in many other problems, there Is actually a strong presumptionthat the price effect dominates for investments in human capital andthe wealth
effect for Investments In non-human cp1tal. That is, parents invest merehuman
and less non-human capital in their better endowed children.This conclusion
does not depend on any assumption about the ease of substitutingbetween
the qualities of different children in their parents' utilityfunction.
Assume that the cost to parents of investing in the human capitalof
their children is negatively related to their endowment, while the costof
investing in their non—human capital (via gifts and bequests)is independent
of their endowment,23 or at least much more independent than for human capital.
If parents invested non-human as well as human capital in each child,
and if the cost of human capital rose with the amount invested in achfld,24
the marginal cost of investing in the human capital of each child would,in
equilibrium, equal the given marginal cost of investingin non-human capital
(otherwise, no investment in the latter would be warranted).Since more human
capital, perhaps much more, would have to be investedin better endowed
children to equate their marginal cost to the marginal cost of more poorly
endowed children, investments in human capital must reinforcedifferences in
endowments. On the other hand, since the marginal costsof all investments
are equal in equilibrium, the total quality (based onnon-human as well as
human capital) of all children must be the same.
25Therefore, investment
in non-human capital must sufficiently compensate childrenwith poorer
endowments to offset exactly the greater investmentof human capital in children
with better endowments.
Most parents, even poorer ones, do usually invest somethingin the human
capital of their children, but give them only negligibleamo..nts (sometimes
even negative amounts!) of non-human capital. Theywould, however, still tend
to invest more human capital in better endowedchildren If they anticipate that
these chHdren will "care" sufficiently about their siblings.Parents would
prefer to invest more in better endowed childrenIf they, anticipate that these
chi ldrcn will voluntarily transfer enough resources to theirsibi ings, because
the average cost of their investments would then he lower.
2613
What may seem surprising is that they .icu1d tend to invest more human
capital in better endowed children even if chfldren were selfish. This
assertion follows from the "rotten kid" theorem (Becker, 1974), which says
that even selfish children take account of their parent's desires if they are
receiving transfers from their parents.In particular, better endowed children
would recognize that their parents would invest more human capital in them
if they transferred enough resources to thoir siblings.
27
Consequently,
they would have a selfish incentive to transfer resources voluntarily to their
siblings; parents then have an incentive to invest more human capital in these
28
better endowed children.
Our conclusion is that the price effect dominates the wealth effect, that
more human capital is invested in better endowed children. Therefore, parents
coiitribute to the observed inequality in earnings by investing more human capital
in children who would receive higher earnings anyway because of their greater
endowment. However, since parents invest more non-human capital in poorly
endowed children, they reduce the inequality In total income relative to that
In earnings.
The "Failure" of Compensatory Education
"Compensatory education has been tried and it apparently has failed.. .The
chief goal of compensatory education -toremedy the educational lag of disad-
vantaged children and thereby narrow the achievement gap between 'minority'
and 'majority' pupils -hasbeen utterly unrealized in any of the large compen-
satory education programs that have been evaluated so far." (Jensen).
So begins Arthur Jensen's famous and controversial essay on compensatory
education and intelligence. His assertion about the apparent failure of com-
pensatory education has not been controversial; indeed, subsequent studies have
only buttressed it. What has been controversial is his linking the apparentI.,
failureto inferior intelligence of the chilaren, primarily black children,
being compensated. Our analysis has nothing directly to add to the controversy about
the relative intelligence of different groups of children, but indirectly may be
relevant because it can explain why compensatory education programs would appear to
"fail ,"evenwhen the children compensated were as able as other children.
Public compensatory education programs essentially increase the "endowments"
of some children in poorer families. The increase in the wealth of these fami-
lies produced by the increase in endowments would induce a redistribution of
parentai time and expenditures away from the children being compensated and to-
ward their other children and themselves. That is, the induced own "compensatory
programs" by parents help defeat the intent of public programs. Al-
though family wealth rises by the full extent of the increase in the endowment
of a child participating in a compensatory program, the total (parental included)
investment in that child may only rise by a small fraction of the increase in
his endowment. The fraction depends on the contribution of his endowment to
family wealth, the family's income elasticity of demand for child quality, and
so forth.
To be sure, compensatory publir. programs may also have aprice or efficiency
effect that lowers (it may also raise) the cost of adding tothe quality of
compensated children. Unlike the wealth effect, such a priceeffect would reinforce
the intent of pubi ic programs because lower costs induce greaterparental investment
in these children.
The important pOint however, is that if the effect on costs wererelatively
unimportant, which is not implausible, the mainresult of compensatory programs
would be to redistribute wealth to families of compensated children,with little
increase in the total human capital invested in these children.Since redistributions
of wealth to these families could be and is achieved more directly, compensatory
programs could legitimately be considered"failures" (although not without any
29
effects on poor families).15
Note that this conclusion does not require compensated children to beInferior
in ability or motivation -thatis, to receive 1ow rates of return on investments
In their human capital -, forthey could even be above average. Nor does it
require compensated programs to be badly planned or administered; again,these
programs could be better run than more successful programs.It requires only
that compensatory programs reduce significantly the amount of time and moneythat
parents invest In their "compensated"children.30
Family Background and Rates of Return on HumanCapital31
Estimated rates of return on education and other human capita1 are biased
because persons with better ability, motivation, and family backgrounds usually
accumulate more human capital than other persons do. Several studies havetried
to reduce this bias by considering differences betweensiblings,32 and many
studies recently nave adjusted for familybackground.33 The argument is that the
variation is ability and the social environment is reduced by considering siblings,
or even persons with similar backgrounds, and that this mightsubstantially
reduce the bias in estimated rates of return.
The difficulty with this argument is that although ability, motivation and
family background are much less variable between siblings orbetween persons with
sithi'ar backgrounds than in the whole population, the covariance betweenthese
variables and the amount invested in human capital may not be any less; indeed,it
may be greater. In introducing the Gorselinedata in his earlier study, Becker said
"...some brothers may become relatively well—educated precisely becauseof unusual
ambition and other kinds of ability rather than because of interest, luck,and
other factors uncorrelated with earnings" (1964, p. 87). Yet it is thecovariation,
not the variation itself, that is the source of the bias inestimated rates of
return.
The analysis in this section does provide the means for determining theeffect
on the bias of considering siblings or unrelated personswith similar family backgrounds. Consider the following relation explaining the human capital invested
by parents in a child:
S =b +b E +b y +b N+u, (3.4)
C 0cc yp n
where Eis the ability, motivation, and other components of his "endowrnent"
Vis parental education, income, and other dimensions of his family background,
N is the number of children in his family, and u represents other influences on
S that are assumed to be independent of E and V ,and b ,b ,band b are c C p 0 n y
constants.
Since 'wealthier" parents invest more in their children, b> 0; indeed, our
analysis implies that b is "large" because an increase in parental wealth
substantially increases their investment if the endowment (Ec) is held constant.
Similarly, by the interaction between quantity and quality discussed in Section 2,
b ç 0. The magnitude and sign of be depends on the relative importance of
parental compensation or enforcement of the endowment; our analysis suggests that
reinforcement dominates for human capital, so that be would be >0(compensation
dominates for non-human capital).
Empirical estimates of the coefficients in equation (3.4) have been scarce
because the same data set has seldom contained information on a child's endowment
and on his family background. Many studies have found a powerful effect of
family background on children's human capital in regressions between these
variables.34Moreover, using an indirect method of estimation, Chamberlain and
Grilliches find that abler brothers received more schooling than less able ones.
Both the powerful effect of background and the positive effect of greater child
ability on parental investment are consistent with our analysis.
The earnings generating equation of a person can be written as
log! —a +rS +aE +v, (3.)
c o ccc
where is his potential earnings, r is the rate of return on the human capital
invested by his parents S, v is assumed to be independent of u, and ac is the
direct effect of endowment on earnings. If his endowment were omitted from
the earnings equation, the bias in the estimated rate of return would depend17
on a ,andthe relation between S and E
e C C.
That is,
r'l =r+ ae Bess
(3.6)
where Bis the coefficient in a regression of E on S .Sincea >0,the
es C C e
direction of the bias is the same as the sign of 8es' and the magnitude of the
bias depends on a as we'll as B
e es
If rates of return were estimated from the earnings of siblings, or from
the earnings of persons with similar family backgrounds, Y would be held constant
when Sc changed; if the number of siblings were also held constant, the
regression coefficient of E on $ would be
8esy -b
-d),36 (3.7)
where d5 is the coefficient in a regression of u on S, when Y is held constant.
The magnitude of d is bounded by zero and unity, and depends on the relative
importance of "random" forces and endowments in determining investments in human
capital. Hence the sign of the bias in rates of return estimated from persons
with similar family backgrounds would be the same as the sign of b. This sign
is determined by whether parents on balance compensate less endowed or reinforce
better endowed children; if reinforcement dominates, as we argue above, be >0,
and rates of return would be overestimated if compensation dominates, be <
andthese rates would be underestimated. The bias would be very large if "random"
forces were unimportant, and if compensation and reinforcement almost offset each
other.
There is a somewhat paradoxical relation between family background and
endowment.If reinforcement dominated compensation (be >0),then children with
better backgrounds might well be less endowed than children with poorer backgrounds
having the same parental ir1vestment in their human capital, in spite of the
general presumption that children from better backgrounds are better endowed.
From footnote 36, this would occur ifey.s jJ_(b+d5)<0, or if b > (3.8)
whered5 c038 is the coefficent tn a regression of u on Y, wftenS is
held constant. Since our theory implies that b is positive and "large,"this
Inequality very likely would hold.
Fortunately, this paradox is resolved quite readily. Consider the simple
case where investment in children is entirely determined by backgroundand
endowment. Then an improvement in background increases the investment, asdoes
an improvement in endowment when reinforcement dominates.Hence if children from
different backgrounds had the same investment, those with better backgroundswould
have to be less endowed; otherwise, more would be invested inthem.39
If reinforcement dominates, and if rates of return were estimatedfrom
persons with different backgrounds, thebias is still necessarily positive.
However, this bias would tend to be smaller than in theestimates that hold
backgroundconstant.140If compensation dominated, the biases could be of
opposite signs: necessarily negative when backgroundis held constant, and
possibly positive when it The bias is likely to be smaller when
background variesbecause itintroducesconsiderable variation in the amount
invested at any given endowment, which provides moreuncontaminated evidence for
estimating the true effect of investment on earnings.
One final point. This analysis is relevant in evaluatingthe many
attempts in recent years to measure thedirect effect of family background on
earnings by including background variables in earnings generatingequations.
If theendowment wereomitted from or only imperfectly measured in these
equations, the estimated direct effect of backgroundwould be biased.Its
direct effect on earnings would be underestimated if an increasein family
background decreased the unobserved endowment whenthe amount invested in
human capital were heldconstant, and overestimated if it increased theendowment. Therefore, the weak positive effect observed in these studies could
give a misleading impression of the true effect.
Conclusions
This paper considers various effects of the existence of an "endowment,"
to each child of inherited ability, public subsidies, and "luck" on the quantity
and "quality" of children. For example, an increase in parental income would
lead to a relatively large increase in parental expenditures on children if
their endowments were fixed because all of the desired increase in the quality
of children would have to come from an increase in these expenditures. The
large increase in expenditures would reduce the demand for children because
the cost of each child is directly related to the expenditure on each.
It is further shown that the elastic response of expenditures to an
increase in parental income implies that even if the true income elasticities
of demand for quantity and quality of children were equal, constant, and of
average size, the observed quantity elasticity would be small and perhaps negative
at lower Income levels, and larger and perhaps positive at higher levels.
Moreover, although the observed quality elasticity could be much larger than
Its true elasticity, the observed quality elasticity would decline as income
rose. Both the observed quantity and quality income elasticities depend on the
degree of intergenerational mobility in economic position and the rate of growth
over time in income: increased mobility would reduce the observed quantity and
increase the observed quality elasticity, whereas increased growth would increase
the observed quantity and reduce the quality elasticity.
If some children were better endowed than others, parents could either
compensate those with poorer endowments by spending more on them, or
reinforce those with better endowments. We show that parents tend to
Invest more human capital in better endowed children, and more non—human20
capital in pooror ones. That is, they reinforce with human capital, and
compensate with non-human capital. Parental responses, therefore, tend to
widen the inequality in earnings, and narrow that in income relative to earnings.
Public (or private) "compensatory" education programs for certain children
would affect the amount of time and money spent on them by their parents.
If increased public expenditures induced a decline in parental expenditures
of time and money, public "compensatory" programs might have only a small
effect on the total investment in "compensated" children, including the invest-
ment by parents. "Compensatory" programs would then appear to fail, evenif
"compensated' children were as able and well motivated as other children, and
even if these programs were efficiently conducted.
Rates of return on the human capital invested by parents in their children
are sometimes estimated from comparisons of siblings, or fromunrelated persons
with similar family backgrounds. These estimates would be biased if endowments
were only imperfectly held constant. For example, if, on balance, parents
reinforced children with better endowments, the true rates would be overestimated
because endowments would also increase as the investment in human capital
increased -giventhe assumption that better endowments are reinforced. Indeed,
the bias would tend to be greater than the bias In estimates that permit
background to vary.
Furthermore, simply entering family background variables directly into
earnings generating regression equations would result in biased, perhaps
quite biased, estimates of the direct effect of family background on earnings.
For if the investment in human capital were held constant, and if endowments
were only imperfectly held constant, an increase in backgroundwould tend to
reduce endowments if parents reinforced children with better endowments (and21
increase endowments if they compensated poorer endowments). Consequently,
the direct effect of background on earnings would be underestimated with
reinforcement (and overestimated with compensation).22
Footnotes:
*
Weare indebted for helpful comments to Dennis DeTray, Zvi Griliches, Reuben
Gronau, Jacob Mincer, and George Stigler.
1See Becker, l97.
2Our indebtedness to Lewis in this section should be obvious from its reliance
on the Becker-Lewis paper. We have also discussed with him the developments in
this section, and had access to some notes that he prepared. He would be a
joint author if that were not seemly In a festschrlft in his honor!
3The introduction of endowments into the analysis of the interaction between
the quantity and quality of children was first done in the content of genetic
inheritance (see Tomes).
1This assumption and the assumption that the quality of eachchild is the same
are made only for convenience of exposition.It would be sufficient to assume
that the expected average quality and endowment of a child is uncorrelated with
the birth order of the child, and even that is much too strong. Therefore,
the discussion In section 3 of differences in the quality and endowment of each
child does not greatly alter the conc}usions of this section.
5A general production function for child quality can be expressed as
w —f(x,t; y),
where x and t are the household's inputs of goods and time, and y are the en-
dowed inputs.If the time input is ignored, and if goods had a constant
marginal product, this function reduces to the additive function
w a(y)x +b(y)y.
InSection 2 of this paper, the simplifying assumption is made that a is inde-
pendent o y; then
wax +b(y)yq +e,
where ax —qis clearly the household's contribution, and bye is the endowed
contribution. Section 3 considers a more general case, where a depends not
only on y, but also on x.23
6Becker and Lcwis develop a slightly more general budget constraint by intro-
ducing "fixed' a well as "variable" costs of the number and quality of children.
This generalization is not pursued here.
7The equilibrium conditions in (2.11) are similar to what they would be if there
were mutual harmful joint production in the household production functions for
quantity and quality, with an Increase in quantity lowering the output of
quality, and an increase in quality lowering quantity (for a general discussion
•1
ofjoint production, see Grossman).
Recently the household production function approach has been criticized
partly because corrrnodity shadow prices are dependent on commodity outputs if there
is joint production (Pollak and Wachter). This property would be a virtue rather
than a vice, however, if it were helpful in understanding behavior (strangely,
they never discuss the value of the household production function approach in
understanding behavior). Indeed, this paper, as well as the ones by Becker-Lewis
and Grossman, do indicate that the effect of commodity outputs on commodity prices
can be used to understand otherwise puzzling empirical findings.
8The elasticity of substitution betweenquality and quantity has to be less than
unity (quality and quantity cannot be close substitutes) if both are to be positive
and finite, this effectively rules out (commonly used) utility functions that depend
on total child services -theproduct of quality and quantity -becausethe elasticity
of substitution of quantity with total quality would equal unity, and with parental
contributions to quality would approach unity as these contributions increased
relative to the endowment.
9Becker-Lewis correctly said that "if
flq
declines as income Irises-aplausible
assumption, we think -'nwould tend to rise with income, even with constant
This "plausible assumption" is an implication of the analysis when
the endowment is not zero.24
1We assume that the Tiebout equiflbriun among different communities is not perfect;
not
hence public expenditures w3uld /befully converted into effectively private on.
For the distinction between intrinsic and actual mobility, see Becker, 19714.
1:Total child quality could decrease, however, if the rise in thedemand for
children induced by the decline in own-contributions were sufficiently large.
The resulting rise in the price of quality could reduce thedemand for quality by
more than enough to offset the effect of the rise in socialincome.
See Social and Psychological Factors Affecting Fertili, p. 1355.
l14ndirectly however, there could be a close link if more mobileparents
expect to have more mobile children because the parent's mobil ity is partly
due to luck, ability, and other factors that are very imperfectly transmitted
to their children.
We assume that the increased rate of growth is due to autonomous technolo—
gica progress or other forces unrelated to parental investment in their
children.If the growth were induced by parental investment, the analysis
would be quite different.
16
For a recent statement of his approach with some supporting evidence, see
Easterlin. We are indebted to Gilbert Ghez for suggesting that our approach
is related toEasterlin's.
l7 redistribution of income and endowments between parents and children,
no matter what the source, would affect the quantity and quality of children.
For example, an increase in the public debt, with the proceeds used by the
current generation, and with head taxes levied on their children (the next25
generation), would reduce the number of children, and increase the total
income per child; that is, the debt would have a negative burden on the next
generation. The results would be more ambiguous if the debt were financed
by income taxes on the children because the cost to parents of increasing
the quantity or quality of their children would be increased by an income
tax. We owe this last point to Robert Barro; he has discussed the effects of
an increase in the public debt with a model that has overlapping generations
and interdependent parental preferences, but that exc1udes arty effects on the
number of children (see Barro).
l8Becker_Lewis concludedifferently, that an increase in market price reduces
quantity by more than quality, because they Ignore the endowment, and assume
that the "fixed" cost of quantity exceeds the "fixed" cost of quality. If
we incorporated this assumption about fixed costs into our analysis, an increase
in market price no longer necessarily reduces qualLty by more thanquantity
because the endowment and fixed costs have opposite effects.
190ur discussion in this sectionhas benefitted from the analysis in Adams.
20lnequalities replace equalities ifsome parental contributions are zero.
conclusion would be modified if parents do not want to spend enough on
their children to equalize the marginal utilities in equation (3.3).They might
either spend nothing on both children, or nothing on the betterendowed, and an
amount on the other that raises his total quality to a level below the endowed
quality of the abler. They still compensate the less able child, but notfully.
22According to the production functiondeveloped in footnote 5,
=a(e),
where e is the endowment and sw/ax is the marginalproductivity of parental




where p is the price of a unit of x. Then an increase in the endowment
lowers or raises p as
q
d w da >
23lnsteadof referring to costs, we could equally well say that rates of return
are positively related to endowments for human capital, and independentof
endowments for non—human capital.





25By equations (3.2) and (3.3)when
Pq1 Pq2
26Theaverage cost would be minimized if sufficiently more wereInvested in
better endowed children to equalize marginal costs.
27Thc "rotten kid" theorem also implies that a child has an incentive to invest
the amount of his own time and energy in himself that is optimal to the family,
even though poorly "endowed" children were fully compensatedwith non—human
capital.
28The one difficulty with this application of the "rotten kid" theorem is that
since much of the return on human capital is received after the investment period,
parents may not be able to insure that less endowedchildren receive the
appropriate transfers from their siblings.
evidence for higher education suggests that reductions in parental
expenditures can nullify most of a public education program (seePeltzman).
30m1s analysis implies that a "total intervention" program —thatis, a program
whereby the State (Plato's Republic?) or some other authority assumesthe27
entire responsibility for investment in a child —, wouldnot appear to "fail"
because offsetting parental reactions would not be possible. Similarly,
if parents invested little, perhaps because of poverty or neglect, a sizeable
compensatory program could not "fail" because only a small induced decline in
parental investments is possible.
31Similar Issues are discussed in a recent paper by Griflches. We are indebted
to James Heckman for helpful comments that corrected some errors in a previous
version.
32 . .
D.Gorseline in the late 1920 s was one of the first to collect data on the
schooling and incomes of siblings. Becker (1964) used Gorseline's data in trying
to determine the magnitude of the bias in his estimated rates of return on
schooling; recently, Chamberlain and GriUches developed a sophisticated statistical
analysis to reconsider Gorseline's data, as well as later data from the Parnes
Study; still more recently, Paul Taubman has been considering the earnings,
schooling, and other aspects of twins.
33See, among others, Bowies, Coieman—Rossi, Levy-Garboua, Leibowitz, and Morgan-
David.
the references in footnote 33,andthe paper by Griliches in this volume.
35Any interaction between Sc and E, and direct effects of family background (vp)
on earnings are ignored (the latter is discussed shortly). The bias resulting
from ignoring any covariation between u and v can be treated along the same
lines that we use to analyze the bias from omitting the endowment






37That is, the oresumptiOn is that (from
footnote 36),
b —.L_(—b—d+d —dd )>O,
ey be
'uys sy usy sy
where d is the coefficient
In a regression of S onV. Since
R2 (d )(d ),
sy syys
where 1k is the simple correlation
between S and V, this canbe written as
sy
b=L_I-bd-dd +R2(1d)1>O.
eybe LyySuySYS sy uSy j
38 persons from different backgrounds
had the same investment,those with
better backgrounds would
tend to be "unluckier;"
otherwise, they would have
greater investment
because an increase inbackground directly raisesinvestment,
and also indirectly raisesit by raising endowment.
39This conclusion was already reached In Becker (1967), and in Mincer.tt would
be reversed if compensation dominated, forthen b <0and B 0 if
e eys
b >d ,whered could now be positive too. Plow if childrenfrom different
yUyS U)
backgroundshad the same investment, those with better backgroundwould be
better endowed since a better endowmentwould offset rather than reinforce a
better background.
13O cn easily be shown that r
B =B +B d 1—d —d (b +d )
es esy eys ys be usyys y uy.s
Since R <1,footnote 37 implies that Bes >0,or that the biasis still
positive when background is free to vary.
Moreover, since d >0,B .< 0,and B <8 if b>—d >0
ys ey S esesy y uy•s
(seeequation (3.8)).
be
0 -ifcompensation dominated -thenclearly
13 <0.
esy
Moreover, assuming that dstill >0
ys
B >.B ifb +d >0
es esy yuyS
or the bias is likely to be less negativewhen background is free to vary.29
If b +d and dwere sufficiently positive, then y uy.s ys
8>0, es
or 8es'y and 8es would have opposite signs.
background directly affects earnings, and were directly included in equation
(3.5),anadditional source of bias is introduced by variation in background.
Although weak direct effects of background on earnings have been found in most
empirical studies, the true effects could be seriously understated (see the
discussion in the text).
point is more fully discussed tn an addendum to the.1975edLton of
Becker's Human Capital, and is only summarized here.
44See the references in footnote33,
wasassumed to be the case in the addendum cited in footnote 43.30
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